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BOOK REVIEW
BOTTOMLESS PIT: TOXIC TRIALS, THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION, AND
POPULAR PERCEPTIONS OF THE LAW
A CIVIL ACTroN. By JonathanHarr. New York: Random House. 1995.
500 pp. $25.00.
Robert F. Blomquistf

INTRODUCTION

"The truth?"....

"The truth is at the bottom of a bottomless

pit."
They passed Samos and Delos on the left and Lebynthos on the
right, when [Icarus], exulting in his career, began to leave the guidance of his companion and soar upward as if to reach heaven. The
nearness of the blazing sun softened the wax which held the feathers together, and they came off. He fluttered with his arms, but no
feathers remained to hold the air. While his mouth uttered cries
...it was submerged in the blue waters of the sea .... 2
In A Civil Action,3 Jonathan Harr paints a captivating and unnerving novelistic picture 4 of the human pathos surrounding one of
t Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; B.S. 1973, University of
Pennsylvania (Wharton School);J.D. 1977, Cornell Law School.
1

JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACriON 340 (1995). The quotation is from one of the key

lawyers in the Woburn case, Jerome Facher, of the venerable Boston law firm of Hale and
Dorr. Facher was counsel for one of the defendants, Beatrice Foods, a Fortune 500
company.
2 THOMAS BULFINCH, BULFINCH'S MYMOLOGY 141 (Richard P. Martin ed., Harper
Collins 1991).
3

HARR, supra note 1.

4 According to the New York Times: "Mr. Harr blends [conflicting character and
institutional conflicts] novelistically, reconstructing conversations and inner thoughts, skillfully portraying the way the lawyers, especially the plaintiffs' lawyers, became so consumed
by the case that it almost destroyed them." Richard Bernstein, Of Tragedy and Truth, Caught
in a Legal Tangle N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 13, 1995, at C17.
The book's dust jacket portrays Harr's account in novelistic terms with a blurb from
legal-thriller writerJohn Grisham ("Whether in truth or fiction, I have never read a more
compelling chronicle of litigation.") and a statement that the "book... reads like a novel,
a chronicle of a modem-day odyssey."
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the nation's most celebrated "toxic tortA cases: Anderson v. Grace.6

Harr depicts the protagonist of the book, Jan Schlichtmann 7-lead
plaintiffs' counsel for eight families in Woburn, Massachusetts who
sued two companies, Beatrice Foods and W.R. Grace for poisoning the
local water supply with industrial chemicals and, thereby, causing the
deaths and diseases of several family members-as a "lanky, impetuous, maniacally persistent personal injury lawyer" 8 who candidly admits to being "blinded by greed."9

Harr recounts Schlichtmann's seemingly endless battles (real and
imagined) with the company lawyers, some of whom possess Dickensonian names like William Cheeseman (Grace's chief attorney) and
Jerome Facher (Beatrice's chief attorney)10 and take on in the tale
ferocious, heartless, malignant, and nihilistic traits, tinged with inno-

5 Toxic tort law is of relatively recent vintage in American law. Its origins can be
traced to the burgeoning growth in the industrial production of synthetic chemical substances following World War II and society's reaction to this growth. Indeed, toxic tort
actions typically involve plaintiffs who claim "actual or potential physical injuries, emotional distress, property damages, and economic losses, which were caused by substances in
the air, ground, and water." Robert F. Blomquist, An Introduction to American Toxic Tort
Law: Three OverarchingMetaphors and Three Sources of Law, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 795, 795-96
(1992) (citations omitted) (quoting Toxic ToRTs AND PRODUCr LLAziITY 11 (Michael A.
Brown ed., 1989)). For a history of American toxic tort law, see generally Robert F. Blomquist, American Toxic Tort Law: An HistoricalBackground, 1979-87, 10 PAcE EN rL. L. REV. 85
(1992); Robert F. Blomquist, Emerging Themes and Dilemmas in American Toxic Tort Law,
1988-91: A Legal-Historicaland PhilosophicalExegesis, 18 S. IL..U. LJ. 1 (1993) [hereinafter
Blomquist, Emerging Themes].
6 Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986), modified &
remanded, 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 891 (1990).
7 Jan Schlichtmann and I were classmates at Cornell Law School from 1974 through
1977. I briefly corresponded with Jan in the late 1980s and early 1990s about the Woburn
litigation, mainly because I had requested briefs from the litigation to use in teaching a
seminar on Toxic and Environmental Torts. My distant memory of Jan is that he was
driven, meticulous, and unrelenting in his preparation and classroom performance. Many
of the descriptions in Harr's book, therefore, ring true and resonate on a personal level
with my memory ofJan Schlichtmann.
8 Bernstein, supra note 4.
9 HARu, supra note 1, at 417.
10 It's hard to describe what I mean by "Dickensonian" names. Suffice it to say that
one knows it when one sees it. See, e.g., some of the characters in the following Dickens
novels: CHARLEs DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD (Nina Burgis ed., Oxford University Press
1988) (including Clara Peggotty, Barkis, Mrs. Gummidge and Uriah Heep); GREAT EXPECTATIONS (Margaret Cardwell ed., Claredon Press 1993) (featuring Phillip Pirrip, Mr. Jaggers, Dolge Orlick and Uncle Pumblechook); THE LIFE AND ADvENTuRES OF NICHOLAS
NICKLEBY (C.E. Brock ed., Dodd, Mead 1931) (including Nicholas Nickleby, Charles Cheeryble, Wackford Squeers and Newman Noggs); and THE PICKWICK PAPERS (James Kinsley
ed., Claredon Press 1986) (featuring Samuel Pickwick, Rachel Wardle, Mr. Skimpia and
Mr. Fogg). Perhaps the hallmark of a Dickensonian name is an onomatopoeic resonance.
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cent eccentricities."1 In Harr's inferno, 12 a federal district courtjudge
arbitrarily and capriciously exercises his judicial powers by overtly
favoring one of the defense lawyers, overlooking evidence, and failing
to adequately address serious discovery abuse.' 3 The jury, charged
with fathoming arcane scientific principles, sorting through a mountain of evidence, and comprehending their role in implementing a
trifurcated trial order which segments the case into a water contamination phase, a medical causation phase, and a damages phase, does
its best but, ultimately, guesses at the outcome.' 4 The plaintiffs, like
victims of a medieval plague, suffer the unexplained loss of their children and loved ones, learn to scorn lawyers and the legal system and,
in the end, seem to just fade away like ghosts in a Shakespearian tragedy.' 5 In Harr's production,' 6 a staggering number and variety of expert scientific witnesses are pampered and paid exorbitant fees;' 7 lay
witnesses and government witnesses are often reluctant to testify and,
of those witnesses who do testify, some lie under oath.' 8 Over the
nine-year saga of the Woburn litigation co-workers, relatives, friends,
and lovers endure or abandon their relationships with the principal
litigators and supporting lawyers;' 9 a Harvard law professor, Charles
Nesson, helps Schlichtmann theorize and strategize while serving as
1

See HARR, supra note 1, at 85-86 (Facher's use of worn litigation bags-one with a

Porky Pig decal from a cereal box on the outside); id. at 87 (Facher's statement to a young
female Harvard Law School student, in a trial advocacy class that he taught, to go back to
her senior partner in a case hypothetical and tell him that she was giving up law practice to
make a living selling cheeseburgers); id. at 88 (Facher's marital problems prior to his divorce); id. at 89 (Facher's use of"hideouts" throughout the law offices of Hale & Dorr); id.
at 95 (Cheeseman's dislike for jury trial work); id. at 96 (Cheeseman's view of all personal
injury cases as involving a "cynical charade"); id. at 97 (Cheeseman's collection of hats and
his "rigorous, logical cast of mind").
12 See DAE AIGHERi, THE INFERNO FROM LA DmNA COMMEDIA (Warwick Chipman
ed., Oxford University Press 1961). Like Dante's Inferno, the legal struggle depicted by
Harr is suffused with life and death overtones. See, e.g., HARR, supra note 1, at 447
(Schlichtrnann's analogy of the possibility of losing the Woburn case to dying); id. at 468
(Schlichtmann's view of the case as "a struggle to the death"); id. (the Woburn litigation as
a never-ending "black hole"); id. at 479 (explicit reference to Dante).
13
See infra notes 86-127 and accompanying text.
14
See HARR, supra note 1, at 293-401.
15

See id. at 14-50 (describing the suffering experienced by Anne Anderson and her

husband over the pain incurred by their son, Jimmy, in living with, and then dying from,
leukemia); id. at 451-54 (reporting client disillusionment with Schlichtrnann).
16 Harr's account should be quite easy to transform into a Hollywood screenplay. His
characters are larger than life, he brilliantly depicts a struggle between good and evil and
the storyline advances at a vigorous pace.
17 See infra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., HARR, supra note 1, at 304-11 (describing the testimony of a former owner
of Riley tannery).
19 See, e.g., id. at 396-401 (describing a failed "love affair" between Schlichtmann and a
woman attorney who had accompanied him to NewYork to be on the GoodMorningAmerica
show).
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the plaintiffs' appellate counsel; 20 and a high-level business executive
of W.R. Grace plays an effective Machiavellian game of psychological
chess in getting Schlichtmann to accept a relatively modest settlement
offer 2 ' which, given Schlichtmann's lavish expenses and debts, provides an insufficient fee for Schlichtmann to avoid bankruptcy and an
emotional breakdown.
A Civil Action has attracted considerable popular attention and
appears to be the prelude to "a major motion picture."2 2 The book,
on one level a case study of modem toxic tort litigation, reflects many
of the issues and dilemmas of contemporary toxic torts jurisprudence.
Part I of this Essay, therefore, extracts and presents three basic themes
of Harr's book: (a) the problem of indeterminate plaintiffs, 23 (b) the
problem of indeterminate defendants, 24 and (c) the problem ofjudi25
cially managing and disposing of complex toxic tort litigation.
Harr's account, however, is more than a case study of modem
toxic tort litigation.2 6 As noted by one critic, it is also
a portrait of the American legal system and several of its practitioners, a kind of cautionary tale about the way in which what ought to
be a straightforward issue of justice and recompense can be transformed by greed and the very rules of engagement into a ruinous
27
and exorbitant miasma.
Accordingly, Part II of this Essay explores various questions of attorney
professional responsibility embedded in Harr's narrative. 28
Part III of this Essay focuses on selected "law and literature" 29 implications of Harr's book, viewed as part of the genre of what has
come to be known as "faction" or "true fiction."3 0 This section argues
that A Civil Action, written by a non-lawyerjoumalist, can be viewed as
an encapsulation of what Richard A. Posner calls "law in popular liter20 See, e.g., id. at 235-63 (describing "billion-dollar Charlie" Nesson and his suggestion
that the recoverable damages in the Woburn litigation could be substantial).
21 See, e.g., id. at 423-28 (describing the psychological interaction between
Schlichtmann and the W.R. Grace executive, Al Eustis, who negotiated the final details of a
settlement in the Wobum litigation. Part of this mental chess game included lunch at the
Harvard Club in Manhattan).
22 Bernstein, supranote 4 (citing dust jacket of book). A CIVIL ACTION has also been
named a finalist for the National Book Award.
23 See infra notes 39-60 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 61-84 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 85-127 and accompanying text.
26
Several other themes pervade the book. These additional themes-not explored
in this Essay-include, but are not limited to, the mental and emotional stress of being a
lawyer; the personality disorders suffered by lawyers; the "user unfriendliness" of the legal
system to laypersons; and the shallowness of lawyers' lives.
27 Bernstein, supra note 4, C17.
28 See infra notes 128-76 and accompanying text.
29 See generally, RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988).

30

See infra notes 177-94 and accompanying text.
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ature";3 ' that viewed as a work of popular literature, the book is significant on three levels: as a contemporary criticism of emerging
cultural problems of the American legal system, as a glimpse of how
lay people regard the law, and as a satirical and political work with
32
parallels to Tom Wolfe's The Bonfire of the Vanities.
I
A

CASE STUDY OF MODERN MASS

Toxic

TORT LITIGATION

Peter H. Schuck's Agent Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disastersin the

Courts3 3 had an immediate and dramatic impact on toxic tortjurispru-

dence, helping to draw together the growing literature on mass toxic
torts,3 4 while offering theoretical and pragmatic insights into the
unique nature of this new type of tort litigation.3 5 In this regard,
Schuck pointed out the special difficulties engendered by the "mass"
character of most toxic tort litigation,3 6 the unique nature of injuries
at stake,3 7 and the powerful constraints and "gravitational forces" of
31
32

RicHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 481 (1995).
THOMAS WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1987).

33

PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS

(1986).
34 Writing in 1986, Schuck cited key law review articles published in the early 1980s,
while discussing the diethylstilbestrol (DES) and asbestos litigations as earlier examples of
the toxic tort genre. Id. at 6. He perceptively noted that "[t]he Agent Orange case is not
the first mass toxic tort litigation ... but it is probably the most revealing and perplexing
example of that legal genre." Id. (endnote omitted).
35 See generally id. at 255-76 (discussing what Schuck calls "versions of legal reality").
36 Id. at 6-8.
In the traditional tort case, A intentionally or negligently injures B. A and
B are usually, but not always, individuals. The classic examples are assault
and battery or a "fender bender" traffic accident. Sometimes, A's conduct
injures more than one victim, as when his negligent driving causes a multivehicle collision. Even in those cases, however, the number of claimants is
seldom large enough significantly to alter either the nature or the manageability of the litigation.
The mass tort differs from the conventional tort both in degree and in
kind. In the mass tort, the number of victims is large; there may be millions
of claimants, as in the Agent Orange case. Its scale inevitably creates qualitative, notjust quantitative, changes in the character of the case and in the
ways in which it must be litigated and judged.
Id. at 6.
37
Id. at 8-9.
In the traditional tort case, the nature of the injury is typically rather
straightforward: an actual assault, physical collision, trespass on land, defamatory statement, act of professional malpractice, or other relatively determinate, well-defined, traumatic interaction between the injurer and
victim. Of course, difficult issues often arise even in conventional tort cases
concerning who did what to whom, when, and with what effect. But these
difficulties can usually be addressed more or less routinely....
In the toxic tort dispute, the nature of the injury is very different and
the processes of establishing, defining, and measuring that injury are far
more complex. A chemical agent (or, less commonly, ionizing radiation) is
suspected of having harmed one or more individuals. Often the pathways
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the "older model of tort litigation" with its "traditional moral claims
38
and legal forms."
Schuck's insights, then, provide a solid intellectual foundation
for exploring the substantive, procedural, and institutional mass toxic
tort theories of A Civil Action.
A.

The Problem of Indeterminate Plaintiffs

One of Jan Schlichtmann's principal problems in litigating the
Woburn case was identifying all of the "victims," and potential tort
plaintiffs, of the hazardous waste groundwater contamination out of
Woburn's total population of 36,000. 39 Schlichtmann knew that various children in east Woburn had contracted leukemia, had either
of causation are difficult to detect, the time periods extend over decades,
and the effects are not readily isolated or scientifically understood.
Id.
38

Id. at 10.

[A] tort case traditionally entailed a very distinctive model of adjudication,
one that possessed a unique moral and legal structure and a characteristic
array of advantages and disadvantages. Increasingly, . . . this model has

been joined by another, quite different one, of which the mass toxic tort
case is perhaps the clearest example. This newer model calls into serious
question many of the premises that underlie the first.
It would be a great mistake, however, to assume that the newer model
has fully obliterated the "tort" aspect of the mass toxic tort case, leaving no
trace of its traditional moral claims and legal forms. Quite the contrary is
true. [Indeed] ... the older model of tort litigation survives, continuing to
exert powerful gravitational forces on the mass toxic tort case, confusing
and constraining the ways in which the dispute may be defined, litigated,
and resolved.
Id. at 9-10 (citation omitted).
39 HARR, supra note 1, at 12. Harr describes the economic and industrial history of
Woburn in lucid and compelling prose. He notes:
Woburn's first commercial enterprise had been a tannery, built by the
Wyman brothers in 1648.... By the Civil War, Woburn had twenty tanneries, matching Philadelphia in the production of leather. The city acquired
the nickname Tan City. The most prosperous bank in town was the Tanner's Bank, and now the high school football team called itself The
Tanners.
The leather trade supported other industries. In 1853 Robert Eaton
founded a chemical factory in northern Woburn, along the banks of the
Aberjona River, and supplied the tanneries with the chemicals-blue vitriol, Glauber's salt, sulfuric acid-necessary to produce leather. At the turn
of the century, Eaton's factory was one of the largest chemical plants in the
country. . . . [But] by the late 1960s [the tanning industry] had been
eclipsed by competition from abroad. A decade later, only the JJ. Riley
tannery in east Woburn, near the Aberjona River, still produced leather....
To attract new businesses the city cleared and developed many acres of
land in northeastern Woburn for industrial parks. Scandal arose when several city officials were discovered to have an undisclosed financial interest
in the land, but development proceeded nonetheless. Up on Commerce
Way, near Interstate 95, several small manufacturing and trucking firms
moved in. Robert Eaton's old chemical factory on the banks of the
Aberjona River was taken over by Monsanto. W.R. Grace, another chemical
giant, built a small plant on land that had once been an orchard. Woburn
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died or were dying from leukemia, and had consumed drinking water
from former town drinking Wells G and H (shown in 1979 to be polluted with high levels of the industrial solvents trichloroethylene, or
TCE, and tetrachloroethylene, or "perc"). 40 However he did not
didn't lack for industry, but somehow there was never enough money to fix
all the cracked sidewalks or the potholes in the street.
Id. at 12-13.
40 The Reverend Bruce Young, minister of the Woburn Trinity Episcopal Church and
a major supporting character in Harr's book, had conducted an informal and amateurish
survey in the autumn of 1979 regarding the number of leukemia cases which had occurred
in Woburn since city Well G had opened in 1964 and city Well H had begun pumping in
1967. Many Woburn residents suspected that these wells contributed to the incidence of
leukemia in the town from 1964 through 1979 because of unusually high levels of industrial solvents found, by happenstance, in the wells in the spring of 1979. As described by
Harr:
The Woburn police were summoned in the spring of 1979 to investigate the appearance of 184 barrels of industrial waste on a plot of vacant
land in northeast Woburn. The person responsible for dumping the barreis in Woburn, the so-called midnight dumper, was never caught, and the
barrels were taken away before their contents could cause any harm. The
whole event would have been inconsequential had it not been for the vigilance of the state environmental inspector who handled the case. He
thought it prudent to test samples of water from Wells G and H, which lay
just a half mile to the south.
The results of those tests reached the desk of Gerald McCall, acting
director for the northeast region of the state environmental department,
on Tuesday afternoon, May 22. McCall took one look at the analysis and
quickly telephoned the Wobum city engineer. He told the engineer to
shut down Wells G and H immediately. Both of the wells were "heavily
contaminated" with trichloroethylene, commonly known as TCE, an industrial solvent used to dissolve grease and oil. The lab found 267 parts per
billion of TCE in Well G and 183 in Well H. The wells also contained lesser
amounts of four other contaminants, among them tetrachloroethylene,
known as perc, another industrial solvent. The Environmental Protection
Agency listed both solvents as "probable" carcinogens.
Id. at 36. Among Reverend Young's parishioners was the Anderson family, consisting of
Charles, Anne and their sonjimmy. The Andersons moved to Woburn in 1965, settling in
the eastern part of town in the Pine Street neighborhood. Id. at 17-18. In January 1972,
Jimmy Anderson was diagnosed as having leukemia. Comparing notes with her neighbors,
Anne Anderson found it odd that there were two other children diagnosed with leukemia
in her neighborhood. Suspicious of the city water that "never tasted right," id. at 21, Anne
Anderson repeatedly talked with Reverend Young about her feelings while he drove Anne
and Jimmy to Massachusetts General Hospital, where Jimmy received treatment for his
leukemia. Skeptical of Anne's obsessional theory, at first, Reverend Young was spurred
into action in 1979, after the discovery of industrial solvents in city Wells G and H, to find
out more about leukemias in Woburn. Young wrote a letter to the editor of the local paper
asking parents who'd had a child diagnosed with leukemia [from 19641979] to come to a meeting at Trinity Episcopal. Maybe they wouldn't discover anything they didn't already know, the minister told Anne. Maybe no
one would show up at the meeting. But it was worth a try, he said, and
Anne agreed.
Id. at 39. Thirty people showed up at Trinity Episcopal in October of 1979. Reverend
Young used the meeting to pass out a health questionnaire that a nurse at Massachusetts
General had helped him prepare.
Reverend Young waited for the questionnaires to be sent back. Several
weeks after the meeting he and Anne met in his office at the church. They
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know what had caused the leukemias to occur.4 1 Perhaps the genetic
background of the children had initiated the leukemias. Maybe
health habits (such as the quality of diet, exercise and medical care)
had triggered the disease in some of the children. It was also conceivable that some or all of the Woburn leukemia cases had been caused
by other environmental exposures such as toxins in the air or suspected carcinogens in common household products, unrelated to the
elevated levels of chemicals found in the east Woburn groundwater. 42
Similarly, because of the latent and chronic quality of many toxic
injuries, Schlichtmann could not be sure that everyone actually
had information on twelve cases. That still did not seem to Young like a
particularly large number over a fifteen-year period, but he did not mention his thought to Anne. He had purchased a street map of the city. Anne
read aloud the address of each case, and the minister marked it on the
map. Of the twelve cases, eight were located in east Woburn, and six of
those were clustered in the Pine Street neighborhood, where perhaps two
hundred families lived. Young thought the distribution looked highly unusual, especially when plotted on the map.
Id. at 40. Schlichtmann ended up representing eight families; these families experienced
childhood leukemia cases and adult diseases going back to 1964.
41 Contrary to the intuitive suppositions of Reverend Bruce Young, Anne Anderson,
and others, expert epidemiological analysis discounts the significance of geographic "clusters" in predicting the cause of leukemia. Dr. Clark Heath of the United States Centers for
Disease Control (CDC), described by Harr as "the world's foremost expert in leukemia
clusters," id. at 41, was not impressed by the Woburn leukemia cluster.
[Heath] knew more, and was certain of less. "Results have suggested little if
any tendency for cases to come in clusters beyond what chance would predict," he wrote in 1982 in the textbook Cancer Epidemiology and Prevention.
Others in the field agreed with this position. Some epidemiologists at CDC,
for example, explained apparent leukemia clusters by analogy to the "Texas
Sharpshooter" effect: a man shoots at the side of a barn and then proceeds
to draw targets around the holes. He makes every shot into a bull's-eye. If
an epidemiologist were to draw a circle around, say, the greater Boston
area, he would find an incidence of leukemia comparable with the rest of
the United States. Draw a circle around Woburn and he'd find a worrisome
elevation. Draw a circle around the Pine Street neighborhood and he'd
find an alarming cluster. Was it a real cluster? Or was he just drawing
bull's-eyes where he found bullet holes?
Id. at 43.
42 See, e.g., HARR, supra note 1, at 238-39. When Schlichtmann attended depositions of
his clients, the defense lawyers would question "the families closely about their use of more
than five hundred brand-name household products-cleaning agents and detergents, rug
shampoos, cosmetics, nail-polish removers, insect repellents, paints, lawn fertilizers, cold
remedies, cough syrups, herbal teas, coffee, even peanut butter." Id.
To Schlichtmann, the strategy behind this exhaustive list was obvious.
These five hundred items all allegedly contained a known or suspected carcinogen. Peanut butter, for example, ranked high on the list, right up with
cigarettes. The reason: all peanut butter contains trace amounts of
aflatoxin B1, a natural but potent liver carcinogen produced by a common
peanut mold. Cheeseman and Facher would try to suggest to a jury that
inasmuch as the cause of childhood leukemia was largely a mystery to medical science, dozens of substances used by the families might just as likely
have caused the Woburn illnesses as the contaminated water.
Id. at 239.
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harmed by the contaminated well water knew that they had, in fact,
been harmed. The HarvardHealth Study, an exhaustive statistical study
of over 7,000 Woburn residents in 1984 by professors at the Harvard
School of Public Health, illustrated this problem. The HarvardHealth
Study authors concluded that the data they compiled " 'strongly suggests the water from [Woburn] Wells G and H is linked to a variety of
adverse health effects."' 4 These adverse health effects included "an
increased rate of fetal and newborn deaths [over the time period 1960
through 1982] among pregnant women whose homes had gotten the
largest quantities of the water."44 Among Woburn children who had
consumed water from Wells G & H, the Harvard scientists
found increased rates of allergies, skin afflictions such as eczema,
and respiratory disorders-chronic bronchitis, asthma, and pneumonia. They also found a "significant excess" of congenital defects
to the eye and ear, of kidney and urinary tract disorders, and of
"environmental" birth defects, a grouping that included cleft palate,
spina bifida, Down's Syndrome, and other chromosomal
aberrations. 45
But the Harvard Health Study used statistical discourse and did not
show that the contaminated well water had actually caused the
hodgepodge of adverse health effects suffered by the residents of east
Woburn.46
Harr's account describes Schlichtmann's lavish and, at times,
Herculean efforts to overcome the problem of indeterminate plaintiffs: extraordinary difficulties of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that his clients had in fact suffered various diseases, sicknesses, and abnormalities due to the consumption of the contaminated well water. Schlichtmann consulted an immunologist from
California named Dr. Alan Levin who "had a theory about the
Wobum case. He believed that constant low-level exposure to TCE

43

Id. at 133. The Harvard Health Study was later published in scientific literature.

See S. Lagakos et al., An Analysis of Contaminated Well Water and Health Effects in Woburn,
Massachusetts, 81 J. OF THE AMER. STATISTICAL Assoc. 583 (1986).
44 HARR, supra note 1, at 133.
45 Id.
46 The Harvard Health Study provoked strong criticism from many professional
quarters. As summarized by Ham.
"This report is characterized by... an ignorance of epidemiological issues,"
wrote one reviewer at the federal Centers for Disease Control. The American Industrial Health Council, an industry research group, denounced the
study as biased, and even one of [the authors'] colleagues at Harvard
stated, "It was an incredible mistake to use as interviewers people who have
a self-interest in the outcome. To my mind thatjust destroys the credibility
of it right there."
Id. at 134.
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had damaged the immune systems of all the members of the Woburn
families." 47 According to Dr. Levin:
"These chemicals always do something," he told Schlichtmann.
"Most of the time they don't do enough damage for us to notice.
You might lose a few cells, but you won't notice it because we've got
a lot of extra cells." A healthy, vigilant immune system will attack
and kill aberrant cells. But if the immune system has been damaged, as Levin speculated, a malignant cell stands a far greater
48
chance of surviving and proliferating.
Levin, in turn, referred Schlichtmann to a pathologist who, responding to Levin's requests, performed a series of lymphocyte counts
and T cell assays 49 on the plaintiffs at an initial cost to Schlichtmann's
firm of ten thousand dollars, 50 with a follow-up control study costing
fifty thousand dollars. 51 Schlichtmann, "insist[ing] on absolute thoroughness,"52 employed a full-time assistant to "find the report of every
visit [by each of the thirty-three Woburn family members involved in
the litigation] to a doctor, of every scraped knee, sore throat, and
common cold." 53 Schlhictmann expanded his inquiry into the medical issues in the case by retaining the services of Chicago physician,
Dr. Shirley Conibear, a specialist in occupational and environmental
medicine; he had his firm pay $88,729 to the specialist for a series of
physical examinations of all twenty-eight living family members. 54 Dr.
Conibear, after discovering that a majority of the Woburn adults
47
48
49

Id. at 136-37.
Id. at 137.

Id.
The lymphocyte count-a simple count of white blood cells-was easy
enough. Any lab could do that. The T cell assays were somewhat more
difficult. All T cells look alike, but they perform different functions, and
distinguishing one from another was a tricky business. The helper T cell,
for instance, identifies foreign organisms-viruses, bacteria, cancerous
cells-and summons killer T cells, which are equipped with cytotoxic enzymes. Another type of T cell, the suppressor, stops the attack of the killer
T cells when the invading organism has been conquered.

Id.

50
51

Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.

Id. at 198.
Id. "For those children with leukemia, the records consisted of thousands of
pages-lab tests, chemotherapy protocols, the notes of nurses, doctors, social workers, and
psychiatrists. And for the adults, some records dated back to the 1930s." Id. at 198-99.
54 It appeared that Schlichtmann's consultation with Dr. Conibear might be worthwhile. As eloquently described by Harr:
Dr. Shirley Conibear had published many articles about the health
problems of industrial workers exposed to toxic chemicals....
For a handsome fee, Conibear had agreed to come to Boston and perform thorough physical examinations of all twenty-eight living family members. Schlichtmann had his staff prepare for Conibear's arrival by leasing a
suite of rooms in a doctor's office building near the Boston University Medical Center and furnishing it with rented equipment. He also arranged ac52

53

THE AMERTCAN LEGAL PROFESSION

1996]

963

showed signs of irregular heartbeats, recommended that
Schlichtmann find a trained heart specialist to conduct further tests.
For an additional cost of $55,762, Schlichtmann hired "a first-rate cardiologist," Dr. Saul Cohen, to conduct "thorough cardiac workups, examinations of the sort the nation's president would receive" to
determine whether TCE exposure could have caused pathological ef55
fects on the adult plaintiffs.
"Almost every medical expert Schlichtmann talked to knew another expert that Schlichtmann might want to talk to." 5 6 In this way,
commodations for a week at the Ritz-Carlton for Conibear and her staff,
which included two other physicians and a lab technician.
Conibear's first round of reports, more than nine hundred pages long,
cost Schlichtmann $88,729. He felt they were worth every penny. He read
that in 1964, the year Well G came on line, Richard Toomey [one of his
clients] had suffered an episode of gastric and abdominal pain so severe
that he'd gone to see a doctor. By 1971, when the wells were operating full
time, Toomey's stomach problems had become chronic. He had also complained repeatedly of sore throats, headaches, nausea, severe sweats, and
various rashes. Toomey's daughter, Mary Eileen, born in 1965, had suffered repeated rashes on her face and legs, sinus problems, vomiting, chills,
and abdominal pains.
One after another, the case histories of the plaintiffs looked astonishingly alike. Conibear told Schlichtmann that the pattern of chronic solvent
poisoning was unmistakable. She -had . . . found more than a hundred
articles on the toxic effects of TCE. Most of those articles dealt with workers who'd been exposed to the solvent, and they cited the same constellation ofsymptoms--dizziness, nausea, vomiting, fatigue, skin rashes. Among
the Woburn families, any one person might have the misfortune to suffer
repeated rashes, chronic abdominal pains and nausea, and sinus and upper-respiratory-tract infections. But for a group of families, related to each
other only by geography and the water they used, to suffer so many common ailments and to have a leukemic child in the family-to Schlichtmann,
that could not be coincidence.
Id. at 200-02.
55 Id. at 202-03. As explained by Harr:
It took Cohen six weeks to complete his examinations of all the [fourteen] Woburn adults and the three oldest teenage children. He began with
routine physicals followed by blood tests, resting electrocardiograms, treadmill cardiograms, and twenty-four-hour-long ambulatory heart recordings
by Holter monitor. When he finished, he delivered to Schlichtmann's office a summary of his findings, along with a three-foot stack of reports that
contained hundreds of pages ....
Schlichtmann read that notjust some but all of the seventeen individuals tested by Cohen experienced irregular heartbeats. The results, Cohen
told Schlichtmann, had surprised him-"quite striking" were his exact
words. Schlichtmann asked Cohen to review Conibear's physical exams
and the index of past medical complaints that she had assembled. "That, in
addition to my own findings, really stunned me," Cohen would testify later
at his deposition. "Iwas very impressed with the consistency of these findings and the similarity of complaints in this particular cohort of patients."
Id.
56

Id. at 206.
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Schlichtmann ended up retaining a dozen different medical experts57
including a neurologist, a biochemist, and a toxicologist.
Ironically, because the trial court judge decided to manage the
case by segmenting the litigation into three distinct phases, 58
Schlichtmann never had an opportunity to present the costly, yet compelling, medical evidence he had accumulated in his far-reaching consultations, 59 although his extensive preparation did help him to
partially overcome the indeterminate plaintiffs problem in settling
with W.R. Grace for $8 million, after the water contamination phase,
60
but before the medical causation phase of the trifurcated litigation.

57
Id. at 203-08. Schlichtmann's willingness to spend such large sums of his firm's
money on the case, however, caused considerable consternation for one of his partners,
Kevin Conway. Conway-whom Schlichtmann had met while both worked as associates in
the Boston law firm of Reed & Mulligan-joined Schlichtmann and another young lawyer
from Reed & Mulligan in forming a new firm called Schlichtmann, Conway & Crowley.
Schlichtmann decided to bring [his twelve medical experts] together for a
conference, a round-table discussion. He rented the Grand Ballroom at
the Ritz-Carlton and paid the plane fare for the experts from California,
Chicago, and Washington, D.C. He paid for their hotel rooms at the Ritz,
their meals and, of course, their time. Most of them billed around two
hundred dollars an hour. The conference began with dinner and drinks
on a Friday evening and continued throughout Saturday. It went so well
that Schlichtmann arranged for a second one, out in Chicago.
Not long after that meeting, Conway discovered that Saul Cohen, the
cardiologist, had charged a hundred dollars an hour for the night he'd
spent sleeping at the Chicago Hilton. This was only half of Cohen's regular
hourly rate, his sleeping rate, as it were. It infuriated Conway, but
Schlichtmann said calmly, "No, he's worth it."
The steadily mounting bills alarmed Conway, but they didn't surprise
him. He had known that Schlichtmann would spend every cent the firm
had on Woburn, and then borrow more. Three years ago, Conway had
predicted that the case would become a "black hole." Now, eight months
into discovery, that prediction seemed on the verge of coming true.
Id. at 208-09.
58 See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
HARu, supra note 1, at 208-09. Getting into Schlichtmann's head, Harr writes:
59
He had come a long way. The case, he told himself, did not depend
on the leukemia claim alone. He now had compelling evidence of chronic
solvent poisoning. And even if the scientific evidence that TCE caused leukemia was weak, there could be no doubt now that exposure to the contaminated water had exacerbated the leukemias. The disease would not have
run the same course. He could argue that more of the children would have
survived if Grace and Beatrice had not contaminated the wells.
Id. at 208.
In an intriguing note on sources at the end of his book, Harr reveals, among other
things, that "[t]he thoughts and feelings of the characters as described in the narrative are
based on what they told me they thought and felt, or what they described as their thoughts
and feelings in transcribed court proceedings." Id. at 494.
60 Id. at 445-48 (discussing negotiations). See generallyScHucK, supra note 33, at 9, 11,
184-89 & 261-62 (discussing the problems of indeterminate plaintiffs and toxic tort litigation, in general, and of Agent Orange litigation, in particular).
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The Problem of Indeterminate Defendants

In addition to the problem of indeterminate plaintiffs, another of
Jan Schlichtmann's principal problems in litigating the Woburn case
was the indeterminate defendants problem. According to Peter
Schuck, this difficulty arises because "the identity of the particular injurers may be unknown, and even if known, it may be impossible,
either in principle or in practice, to accurately allocate responsibility
for the harm among them."6 ' As Schlichtmann asked himself at the
beginning of his involvement in the case: "Whose chemicals had polluted the wells? Who had dumped these chemicals, and when had
they gotten into the water supply? Had they in fact caused
62
leukemia?"
Schlichtmann's first lead in finding out who might be responsible
for contaminating Wells G & H with industrial solvents came in 1982
from a preliminary investigative report prepared by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Schlichtmann learned about the
existence of the EPA report through another attorney, Anthony Roisman, who was the Executive Director of a Washington D.C. publicinterest law firm named Trial Lawyers for Public Justice. 63 "Roisman
was in his early forties, a Harvard Law School graduate who had been
head of the U.S. Justice Department's Hazardous Waste Enforcement
Section during the Carter Administration." 64 Roisman had made use
of the Freedom of Information Act6 5 to obtain documents from the
EPA about Woburn's groundwater contamination. According to the
EPA's preliminary report, obtained by Roisman and shared with
Schlichtmann, the agency had identified an area of high TCE concentrations surrounding Wells G and H. 66 Calling for further study, the
report did not identify which of the several industries in the area was

supra note 33, at 9.
Hmt, supranote 1, at 68. In other words, assuming that elevated levels of TCE and
perc could actually cause leukemia and other adverse health effects actually suffered by the
plaintiffs, and further assuming that Schlichtmann's clients were actually exposed to these
chemicals through consumption or use of water from Wells G & H, the following factual
issues remained: who was responsible for contaminating the wells, and in what amount, and
what amount was each plaintiff exposed to over a period of several years?
63 Schlichtmann had learned about Roisman through Reverend Bruce Young, see
supranote 40, who had been put in contact with Roisman through a staff member in Senator Edward Kennedy's office. The staffer knew of Reverend Young through his testimony
with other Woburn residents before the U.S. Senate's Committee on Public Works and the
Environment in hearings that ultimately led to the enactment of the Superfund law. HARR,
supranote 1, at 76-78.
64
HARm, supra note 1, at 77.
65 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1995).
61
62

SCHUCK,

66

HARR, supra note 1, at 78.
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responsible for the contamination. 67 However, the EPA did put
68
Woburn on its "Superfund" list.
After their initial meeting in early 1982, Schlichtmann and Roisman decided to join forces, with Roisman as lead counsel and
Schlichtmann as local counsel. Their agreement further provided
that Roisman's firm, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, would bear half
the costs of preparing the Woburn case, with Schlichtmann's firm
picking up the other half. Moreover, Schlichtmann and Roisman
agreed that the latter's firm would receive "two thirds of any fee that
might result from a settlement or a verdict" and Schlichtmann's firm
would receive the other third. 69 Target defendants first appeared after Schlichtmann and Roisman decided to hire a Princeton University
professor who was "an expert in groundwater contamination and hazardous wastes" 70 to interpret the EPA's preliminary report. Based on
the professor's analysis, two Fortune 500 companies with manufacturing facilities in the immediate vicinity of Wells G and H were identified as probable sources of the TCE that had contaminated the east
Woburn drinking water. These two companies were W.R. Grace, a
multinational chemical company, and Beatrice Foods, manufacturer
7
of an assortment of consumer products. '
When they filed their complaint in May of 1982-eight days
before the expiration of the statute of limitatiois-Schlichtmann and
Roisman at least had a theory of the injuries suffered by their clients
and how the defendant companies had contaminated Wells G and H.
The complaint claimed that subsidiaries of Beatrice and Grace had
poisoned the plaintiffs' drinking water with various toxic chemicals,
67
68

Id.
Id.

69
Id. at 77. Schlichtmann's one-third share of any settlement or verdict in the case
had to be divided equally between his firm and Mulligan (the lawyer from Schlichtmann's
former firm who had obtained the case in the first instance). Id.

70

Id. at 78.

71

Id. at 78-79.
The EPA report was highly technical, filled with maps of bedrock and
groundwater contours, well logs, and scientific jargon.... The professor
told Roisman and Schlichtmann that the underground plume of TCE coming from the northeast appeared to originate at a manufacturing plant
owned by W.R. Grace .... The other source of contamination, to the west
of Wells G and H, came from the fifteen acres of wooded land that was
owned by the John J. Riley Tannery. And the tannery, it turned out, was
itself owned by the giant Chicago conglomerate Beatrice Foods, producer
of dozens of consumer goods, from Samsonite luggage to Playtex bras, Peter Pan peanut butter and Tropicana orange juice.
Both companies ranked high in the Fortune 500. In the lexicon of
personal injury lawyers, they had "deep pockets," and this fact had weight
for Schlichtmann and Roisman.... To Schlichtmann, having Grace and
Beatrice as defendants in the case was like learning that a woman his
mother kept trying to set him up with had a huge trust fund.
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including TCE. According to the complaint, TCE was" 'a potent central nervous system depressant that can cause severe neurological
symptoms such as dizziness, loss of appetite, and loss of motor coordination. It can produce liver damage and cause cell mutations and
cancer."' 72 The complaint, which sought compensatory as well as punitive damages "for the willful and grossly negligent" acts of the two
companies, went on to assert that the defendants' actions in poisoning
the plaintiffs' water "had resulted in a cluster of leukemia, the deaths
of five children, and injuries to all of the [thirty-three] family members who were party to the lawsuit, including 'an increased risk of leukemia and other cancers, liver disease, central nervous system
73
disorders, and other unknown illnesses and disease."'
However, when Jan Schlichtmann, who ultimately took over the
lead counsel role in 'the case,74 focused his efforts on provingthe plaintiffs' allegations of groundwater contamination by Beatrice and Grace,
he encountered a variety of difficulties. Initially, in pre-trial skirmishing, Grace's lawyer, William Cheeseman, brought to the attention of
the court a newspaper article quoting a research assistant for the
plaintiffs who apparently had admitted that there was "no firm proof
of a connection between the families, the chemicals found in their
wells, and the two companies." 75 Secondly, the EPA's failure to identify either Grace or Beatrice as likely sources of the contamination of
Wells G and H in its preliminary studies prepared before the lawsuit
began weighed against the plaintiffs. 76 Thirdly, in another pre-trial
move, Grace's lawyer was given permission to implead another company, Unifirst, that had a dry cleaning facility in east Woburn and
used large quantities of perc, an industrial chemical and suspected
carcinogen found in high concentrations in Wells G and H. 7 7 At first
blush, it seemed possible that the presence of another polluter in the
case would further cloud the question of factual causation against Beatrice and Grace. 78 Fourthly, pre-trial discovery of assorted employees
72

Id. at 81.

Id.
74 See id. at 142-43 (describing the change in the co-counsel agreement).
75 Id. at 100. The vehicle for this statement, Grace's motion for sanctions against
Schlichtmann under FED. R. Civ. P. 11, was not successful. Grace's Rule 11 motion for
sanctions was dismissed in spite of the uncertainties and tentative information
Schlichtmann had used as a basis for the complaint against Grace. Id. at 85-119.
73

76

Id.

Id. at 144.
As things worked out, however, Cheeseman's motion to implead Unifirst was a temporary godsend for Schlichtmann. As explained by Harr
In the months that followed, Unifirst's lawyers filed countersuits against
both Grace and Beatrice. Cheeseman still wanted to keep Unifirst in the
case, but Grace's in-house corporate counsel finally overruled him. Unifirst
was causing too much trouble and it did not look as if the company would
77
78
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of Beatrice and Grace proved to be inconclusive. 79 While
Schlichtmann had uncovered considerable physical evidence and eyewitness accounts of Grace's dumping of sizeable quantities of TCE and
other industrial materials on the ground outside its east Wobum
plant, 0 discovery produced only weak evidence of Beatrice's employees' dumping of harmful wastes. 8 ' Moreover, Schlichtmann's proof
that the chemicals dumped by the defendants over the years had actually reached Wells G and H was scant. Finally, Schlichtmann's two
experts at the first stage of trial, the "waterworks phase," stumbled: his
geologist withered under cross-examination, 82 while his groundwater
flow expert from Princeton made fundamental mistakes that affected
83
his credibility before the jury.
Schlichtmann ended up winning "half a loaf" for his clients after
the "waterworks" phase of the trial. While the jury found
Schlichtmann's evidence and argument against Beatrice insufficient
to conclude that any toxic chemicals had leached through the soil and
contaminated plaintiffs' drinking water, the jury did find Grace re84
sponsible for contaminating Wells G and H with TCE.
C.

The Judicial Management Problem

The trial court judge who presided over the Woburn litigation
after the case was removed from state court to federal court 85 was
United States District CourtJudge WalterJay Skinner. At the time of
ever cooperate in a joint defense. Against his will, Cheeseman was forced
to dismiss all claims against the company.
Id. at 146. Moreover, Schlichtmann negotiated a one million and fifty thousand dollar
settlement with Unifirst that was used to finance the continuing litigation against Grace
and Beatrice. Id.
79 Id. at 155-83.
80 Id. at 143-83.
81 Id. at 183-93.
82 Id. at 297-304.
83
Id. at 325-40. Ironically,
As it later turned out, [the Princeton groundwater flow expert] Pinder
was generally right. In its final report, released two years after the trial, the
EPA concluded that the Beatrice property "contains the most extensive area
of contaminated soil" and "represents the area of highest groundwater contamination at the Wells G & H site." The report may have vindicated
Pinder, but it came out too late to do Schlichtmann any good.
Id. at 339.
84 Id. at 392-94. Thus, Schlichtmann was able to eventually negotiate with Grace for a
settlement of the case in the amount of eight million dollars, in lieu of Grace having to
endure the next phase of the tria-the medical causation phase. Id. at 405-48.
Schlichtmann also appealed the Beatrice verdict and, due to newly-discovered evidence
regarding the hazardous waste dumping practices at Beatrice's Riley Tannery that was withheld during discovery, attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to obtain a new trial against Beatrice on the grounds of abuse of discovery by defense counsel. See id. at 459-89. See infra
notes 110-27 and accompanying text.
85 Id. at 99.
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the court clerk's assignment of the case to him, Judge Skinner, a graduate of Harvard Law School, was "fifty-six years old, his hair turning
86
white, his blue eyes pale and watery behind horn-rimmed glasses."
While Judge Skinner had a reputation as an able and experienced jurist, even he had trouble managing and disposing of the
Woburn case. This is not surprising. "Toxic tort cases 'can be more
complex than the ordinary tort case' and 'massive in terms of environmental or individual impact and dollar exposure."' 8 7 Accordingly,
"[these] cases sometimes require the application of creative case man88
agement techniques."
Theoretically, in addition to the inherent judicial power to use
discretion in handling a court case, there is a panoply of special case
management techniques available to American trial judges in toxic
tort cases like the Woburn litigation. Specific case management measures include: discovery conferences and orders; 89 pre-trial confer-

Harr's description ofJudge Skinner is vivid and memorable:
At [the] time [of his assignment to the Woburn case] Judge Walterj. Skinner had a backlog of more than five hundred cases. Each month, the
[clerk-initiated] lottery piled twenty to thirty new cases on top of that backlog. The vast majority of these cases would settle before trial, but they usually settled only afterJudge Skinner had met with the lawyers in a pre-trial
conference and threatened an early trial date.
Id. at 105-06.
87 Blomquist, EmergingThemes, supranote 5, at 13 (quoting Kyle A. Kane, Managingthe
86

Toxic Tort Defense, in Toxic TORTS PRACTICE GUIDE § 30.01, at 30-32 (James T. O'Reilly ed.,

2d ed. 1992))
88

Id.

89

See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) and equivalent state rules.
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ences and orders;90 appointment of special masters;9 ' consolidation; 9 2
multidistrict litigation under federal statutory authorization; 93 segmented trial of various issues or claims;9 4 class actions; 95 and special
jury interrogatories. 9 6 Recent federal and state judicial opinions illus97
trate the effectiveness of these techniques.
On one level of analysis, Harr's portrayal ofJudge Skinner depicts
a busy federal judge who, by dint of his commanding and forceful
presence, moved the Woburn litigation along in an effective and efficient manner, while patiently responding to the "hardball" tactics of
the trial lawyers in the case.98
90
See FED. R. Cirv. P. 16 and equivalent state rules. Rule 16(a) provides that "the court
may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to
appear before it for a conference." As pointed out by the Advisory Committee:
The amended rule makes scheduling and case management an express
goal of pretrial procedure. This is done in Rule 16(a) by shifting the emphasis away from a conference focused solely on the trial and toward a process of judicial management that embraces the entire pretrial phase,
especially motions and discovery.

FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note. See also FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION SECOND § 21.21 (1985) (recounting a series of extensive pre-trial

conferences recommended to be held in complex cases).
91 See FED. R. Crv. P. 53 and equivalent state rules. As a general proposition, a reference to a master "shall be the exception and not the rule." Id. at 53(b). Moreover, injury
cases, a reference "shall be made only when the issues are complicated." Id. In nonjury
actions, "save in matters of account and of difficult computation of damages, a reference
shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it." Id. See
also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 94 F.R.D. 173 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (wherein the
trial judge ruled that appointment of a special master to resolve disputes and discovery
disagreements was warranted in a highly complex toxic tort case because of: (i) the magnitude of the case; (ii) the sheer complexity of the anticipated discovery problems; (iii) the
volume of documents to be reviewed-many of which were subject to claims of privilege;
(iv) the number of witnesses to be deposed; and (v) the need for a speedy processing of all
discovery issues to meet the trial date); HANDBOOK OF RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE
TRIAL OF PROTRACTED CASES, 25 F.R.D. 351, 381-83 & 390-94 (1960) (discussing, among

other issues, the use of special masters).
92 See FED. R. CIrv. P. 42 (a) and equivalent state rules.
93 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1995). The legislative history of this section reveals that:
The objective of the legislation is to provide centralized management
under court supervision of pretrial proceedings of multidistrict litigation to
assure the "justand efficient conduct" of such actions. The committee believes that the possibility for conflict and duplication in discovery and other
pretrial procedures in related cases can be avoided or minimized by such
centralized management.
H.R. REP. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.CAN. 1898,
1899-1900.
94 See generally FED. R. Cn,. P. 42(b) and equivalent state rules. Judicial economy and
prevention ofjury confusion are the primary purposes for allowing trials of various issues
or claims.
95

See FED. R. CIv. P. 23 and equivalent state laws.

96 See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a) and equivalent state laws.
97 Blomquist, Emerging Themes, supra note 5, at 15-25.
98 See, e.g., HARR, supra note 1, at 107-19 (describing Judge Skinner's handling of
Grace's Rule 11 motion by William Cheeseman againstJan Schlichtmann; brooking prolix
legal memorandum filed by the attorneys; finding room in his "busy trial calendar" to
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; On another level of.analysis, however, at least two of Judge Skinner's case management judgment calls are extremely troubling.
Taken chronologically, the first questionable management call of significance began with Judge Skinner's last-minute decision, on the eve
of trial and after the jury had been empaneled, 99 to trifurcate the liability and damages issues in the case into a responsibility phase, a causation phase, and a damages phase. While this decision should have
been made months earlier at the final pre-trial conference, the judge
was right to be concerned about the potential for jury confusion and
the practical difficulties of addressing all claims by all litigants in one
trial. As Harr informs us, Judge Skinner remarked: " 'I've been trying
to picture what this trial is going to look like,' the judge told the lawyers. 'You've got thirty-three plaintiffs, and to submit all thirty-three
of these causation and damage issues in one trial may be unbelievably
cumbersome. It's very complicated.' "100
The judge decided to divide the trial into three separate phases.
The first stage of the trial, the "'waterworks' phase of the case" focused on whether Beatrice and Grace could be linked to the contamination of Wells G & H.10 1 According to the judge, " '[u]nless you get
the product being dumped on the property and getting into the
water, there's no case. There's no point in going any further."' The
second stage of the trial focused on the causation question: "had the
chemicals in fact made the surviving family members sick and killed
the children?" 10 2 Thejudge went on to say "'[i]f the jury decides that
favorably.., then you have to ask, How much is that worth? How
much compensation do you give somebody for the loss of a child?' "1103
Thus the link between Grace, Beatrice and the water, and the link
04
between the water and the injuries were presented separately.1
However, Judge Skinner's approach to the practical cumbersomeness of the case unfairly prejudiced the plaintiffs' case for three reasons. First, Judge Skinner's management order overtly favored Mr.
Facher, the Beatrice attorney in the case. Apparently, the judge was
"trying to make amends for denying [Facher's earlier] plea for a sixmonth delay." 10 5 But, Judge Skinner routinely favored Facher
throughout the long course of the litigation, apparently due to law
accommodate the various motions of the attorneys;judiciously handling questionable legal

practices by counsel; attempting to expedite amicable voluntary resolution of the various
issues); id. at 267-90 (ruling on Beatrice's motion to postpone the trial; empaneling the
jury); id. at 293-376 (conducting the waterworks phase of the trial).
99 Id. at 285.
100
101

Id.
Id. at 286-87.

102

Id. at 287.

103

Id.

104
105

Id. at 287-88.
Id. at 287.
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school ties and prior acquaintance. 10 6 Second, while Judge Skinner's
order made sense, it was also dangerous, as Professor Charles Nesson
unsuccessfully argued in his role as plaintiffs' co-counsel: "[T] he jurors would come into the courtroom expecting to hear a human
drama about the poisoning of the Woburn families. Instead, they'd
first have to sit through a case about geology and groundwater movement."' 0 7 Third, from the standpoint of both epistemology and cognitive psychology, Judge Skinner's artificial breaking up of the
Woburn story into three distinct phases confounded the jury's ability
to understand the case.' 0 8 The tortious wrong implicated in the case
was the negligent poisoning of a particular human drinking water
source with toxic chemicals that, eventually, caused plaintiffs to suffer
death and disease. Such a factual scenario needs to be heard synoptically, not in a piecemeal fashion.
The second significant questionable case management judgment
call by Judge Skinner is two-pronged: (1) his mishandling of
Schlichtmann's post-trial motion for a new trial based upon discovery
abuse by counsel for Beatrice' 0 9 and (2) the judges further actions
(on remand from the United States Court of Appeals) regarding the
so-called "misconduct hearings" leading to his decision not to grant
Schlichtmann's request for a new trial against Beatrice." 0
It all began during a routine search of the regional EPA's records
by one of Schlichtmann's assistants in 1987-over a year following the
end of the "waterworks" phase of trial. In this search, Schlichtmann
discovered a groundwater analysis report prepared by an environmental engineering firm in 1983 (three years before the start of trial) for a
subsidiary of Beatrice: the John T. Riley Tanning Company.
Schlichtmann was "astounded" because " [h] e had never seen this report before, and yet he had asked repeatedly, in interrogatories, in
depositions, and by subpoena-on eleven separate occasions, he
counted-for all such documents.""' The newly-found report was
highly probative, Schlichtmann thought, of the issue of groundwater
contamination of Wells G and H by toxic substances emanating from
106

See, e.g., id. at 464 (ruling Facher was not to blame in failing to turn over key docu-

ments in discovery).
107 Id. at 287.

Nesson tried to change the judge's mind. "This is the defendants' plan," he
began, but the judge quickly interrupted him.

"No, it's my plan," the judge insisted.
"It's your plan," conceded Nesson. "But when you start the trial with
essentially a bloodless issue, where you don't have the families, that's very
advantageous to the defendants."
Id.
108
109
110

Ill

See id. at 372.
See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
HARR, supra note 1, at 460.
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Beatrice's land: "The report stated that groundwater from under the
[Beatrice] tannery flowed to the east, toward the city wells, through
very porous soil, exactly as Schlichtmann's expert.., had predicted.
Tannery waste, described in the report as 'a black sludge resembling
peat,' had been dumped down the hillside leading to [Wells G &
H]

"112

In light of the Beatrice groundwater report, Schlichtmann made
a motion for a new trial. During oral argument, Judge Skinner curtly
doubted that the report would have been helpful to the plaintiffs at
the time of the "waterworks" phase of trial. Moreover, during the argument on the motion, the judge let pass, without sanction, a threat
of physical violence made by Facher against Schlichtmann;" 3 the
judge also denied Schlichtmann's request to ask Beatrice's attorneys
"if they knew of any other documents relevant to the lawsuit that they
had failed to produce." 114 Taking nine weeks to issue his order,Judge
Skinner-in an analysis that is as incredible as it is shallow-"found
that the [Beatrice groundwater] report was, on balance, 'more
favorable' to Beatrice than not, 'or at the most of neutral value.' Its
presence in the case would not, therefore, have materially affected the
outcome of the trial."" 5 "The judge did agree, however, that
Schlichtmann had properly asked for the report." And that opposing
counsel "should have given it to him." 1 6 However, this "default" was
due to "lapse of judgment" and not a "deliberate conspiracy."" 7 In
fact, the judge concluded that Schlichtmann himself was partially re112

Id.
If he'd had this report, thought Schlichtmann, the trial would have been a
different event altogether. The report bolstered the testimony of all his
own experts. And who knows what other discoveries the report might have
led him to? Certainly Facher must have known about this report. Why had
Facher hidden it? And what else had he hidden? Was it possible that there

was more?
Id.
113

At the hearing on Schlichtmann's motion,
Facher, quivering with rage and indignation, stood directly behind
Schlichtmann. He lifted his hand as if he were about to strike
Schlichtmann on the head.
From the comer of his eye, Nesson saw this movement and leaped up
to confront Facher. Judge Skinner jumped up, too, and then so did
Schlichtmann. "I will meet him in the hall if he wants to," sputtered
Facher, looking up at Schlichtmann, who towered over him. "Or Charlie,
too."

"Everybody sit down!" roared the judge. "I'm not going to have this
bickering between counsell"
Id. at 462.
114 Id. 462-63.

115

Id. at 464.

116

Id.

117

I&
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sponsible for the failure to produce the report, because he insisted on
"rushing" to trial." 18
Schlichtmann appealed Judge Skinner's ruling on the groundwater report to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, merging appeal of the judge's ruling on the verdict at the
"waterworks" phase of trial with the judge's post-trial decision denying
plaintiffs' motion for a new trial because of discovery abuse.
Schlichtmann believed that the trial court decisions "went to the very
heart of the judicial system." 1 9 While the appellate court affirmed
Judge Skinner's findings on the jury verdict below, the appellate panel
found, contrary to Judge Skinner's ruling, that "the record contains
clear and convincing evidence" of discovery misconduct by Beatrice's
counsel.' 20 The First Circuit found, therefore, thatJudge Skinner had
"abused his discretion in this instance, 'an error that was compounded
when he proceeded to make findings of fact [about the discovery
dispute] on the very matters which inquiry could reasonably have been
expected to illuminate.""1u2 Accordingly, Judge Skinner was ordered
to conduct further" 'aggressive' inquiry" into the discovery allegations
and to report back to the appellate court, which retained jurisdiction
22
in the matter'1
Judge Skinner, however, did not expeditiously and properly manage and dispose of the misconduct remand order. Although the
judge initially asserted that he was going to "exercise quite stringent
control over the shape of the [misconduct] hearing," he summarily
rejected considering any affidavits from eyewitnesses and insisted that
all witness statements be made in open court, subject to cross examination.' 23 Over the course of two months, some two years after the
end of the "waterworks" phase of the case, Judge Skinner "heard the
testimony of twenty-six witnesses and received into evidence 236 exhibits totalling almost three thousand pages. The misconduct hearings lasted longer than most major trials."'124 Incredibly, however,
after another four months had passed and Judge Skinner issued his
opinion, in which he absolved Facher of any misconduct, the judge
found it necessary to convene yet another round of misconduct hearings wherein Beatrice would bear the burden of proving that the misconduct of one of its affiliated lawyers had not "materially impaired"
118

Id.

"19

Id. at 465.

120
121

Id. at 466.
Id.

122

Id. at 466-67.
Id. at 467-68.
Id. at 477.

123
124

19961

THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION

975

Schlichtmann's development of the case.' 2 5 In this further round of
post-trial misconduct hearings, Facher tried to call Schlichtmann to
the stand to ask him, under oath, whether Schlichtmann had been
prevented from developing the case against Beatrice because he did
not have access to Beatrice's newly-discovered groundwater report.
Schlichtmann refused. Then the judge demanded to see
Schlichtmann's investigative file to see whether or not he had comparable groundwater information about the Beatrice tannery property.
In an unfair turning of the tables, Judge Skinner's final report to the
Court of Appeals on the discovery misconduct zeroed in on
Schlichtmann, who had no notice that his conduct was under review
for possible judicial sanction at this point in the litigation. 2 6 Harr
vividly portrays the impact of Judge Skinner's ruling in the following
language, worthy of extensive quotation:
[Schlichtmann] awoke from a nightmare into a nightmare. At
the office that morning, the judge's clerk called to say that Skinner
had just issued his final report to the Court of Appeals.
Schlichtmann walked up Milk Street to the courthouse, accompanied by Crowley. "I know I'll be enraged when i see it," he told
Crowley. "That arthritic old bastard is going to do something to
me."
Up on the seventh floor, at the office of the civil clerk, Judge
Skinner's clerk handed Schlichtmann a copy of the decision.
Schlichtmann flipped quickly through the pages, scanning the
judge's words. Schlichtmann's investigative files ("a thorough and
well-documented inquiry", wrote the judge) contained "no support
whatsoever for the claim of disposal of the complaint chemicals at
the tannery site, or by the tannery on the 15 acres." Judge Skinner
concluded that at the start of the case, throughout the entire trial,
during the appeal and the misconduct hearings, and up to the present moment, Schlichtmann "knew there was no available competent
evidence tending to establish the disposal of the complaint chemicals by the defendant itself, either at the tannery site or on [its] 15
acres."
Accordingly, the judge found that Schlichtmann had violated
Rule 11 by pursuing a frivolous claim that had no support in fact.
This constituted clear misconduct.
But Schlichtmann's misconduct, continued the judge, was balanced by the misconduct of [Beatrice-affiliated attorney, Mary
Ryan] in concealing the [groundwater] report. Thus, concluded
Skinner, "in the convoluted context of this case, it is my recommendation that neither party should profit through sanctions from the

125
126

Id. at 483-84.
Id.
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delinquency of the other, and that should be the sanction for both
12 7
of them."

It is clear thatJudge Skinner's decision to trifurcate the case on
the eve of trial, and his handling of the Rule 11 sanctions, as well as
his thinly described favoritism towards Jerome Facher had a tremendous impact on the outcome of the case.

II
QUESTIONS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Questions abound concerning the ethics and mores of the numerous attorneys portrayed in A Civil Action. Indeed, one of the most
powerful themes in the book is the widespread professional irresponsibility of the lawyers involved in the Woburn litigation. 12 8 For purposes

of this Essay, I focus on the three leading lawyers for the key litigants:
Jan Schlichtmann, the chief lawyer for the plaintiffs; Jerome Facher,
lead counsel for the defendant Beatrice; and William Cheeseman, the
129
principal lawyer for the defendant Grace.
A.

Jan Schlichtmann

Jan Schlichtmann certainly meant well. Harr's account portrays
him, on balance, as a sympathetic character with many worthwhile
127

Id. at 486-87. The Court of Appeals adopted Judge Skinner's recommendation

with open arms. As described by Harr
It was not their job, stated the court, to second-guess a trial judge who was
intimately familiar with the "checkered history and inner workings of this
convoluted case." Judge Skinner deserved commendation for having "tackled so thankless a task with incisiveness and vigor." The court upheld all of
Judge Skinner's findings as "sound, well-substantiated, and free from observable legal error," and endorsed the recommendation for sanctions.
"This long safari of a case," concluded the court, "may at last be brought to
a close."
Id. at 487-88. Query. Is the First Circuit's decision really based on wanting to get rid of a
nettlesome case and to, simultaneously, discourage large, complex cases which have the
potential for tying up judicial resources for years at a time?
128
Cf the platitude articulated byjustice Felix Frankfurter in Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (concurring) ("From a profession charged with such
responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high sense of
honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that
have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described as 'moral character'").
129 This Essay does not contend that any lawyer discussed necessarily breached ethical
standards or would be held to have violated specific attorney professional responsibility
standards before a state disciplinary board. Rather, the Essay merely comments on some of
the logical implications that could be asserted from the language in Harr's text. Definitive
judgments are not made herein. Moreover, I openly acknowledge that additional contrary
accounts of the attorneys' conduct in the Woburn litigation might very well lead to a different conclusion. I do not undertake to look for that additional evidence, however, since the
purpose of this Essay is to review the book, A Civil Action.
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traits, including: astuteness, 3 0 generosity, 13 1 thoughtfulness, 3 2 candor,133 public-spiritedness, 3 4 industry, 135 thoroughness, 1 36 courage,13 7 tenacity, 3 8 and articulateness. 13 9 However, in the book,
Schlichtmann's positive traits are somewhat diminished by his moodiness, 14 0 spendthrift and ostentatious financial behavior,' 4 ' selfcenteredness, 142 unwillingness to listen carefully to others, 14 3 quick
temper,'4 and greed. 14 5
Greed, it seems, was the root cause of most of Schlichtmann's
professional responsibility problems in the Woburn litigation. 146 Despite a breathtaking run of significant personal injury victories and
settlements while in his thirties, 147 Schlichtmann never seemed to be
satisfied. He was always pressing for more. While money, in the abstract, was not that important to him, he visibly relished the material
things that money could buy. After a few years of trying personal injury cases in the fast lane, Schlichtmann came to expect to live with
14 8
kingly flair.
130

HARR, supra note 1, at 55.

131
132

Id.
Id.

133

Id. at 58.

134
135

Id. at 59.
Id. at 61, 65.

136

Id. at 61, 127-28.

137

Id. at 62-63.

138
139
140
141
142

Id. at 66.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 73, 123-25.
Id. at 55, 81-82.

143

Id. at 74-75.

144

Id. at 108.
Id. at 417.
146
Id. Cf the homily from an early American Bar Association ethics opinion: "Ours is
a learned profession, not a mere money-getting trade." FRED R. SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD
DIcIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 132 (1993) (citation omitted).
147 See HARR, supra note 1, at 54, 123-24 (describing the settlement of Copley Plaza
Hotel fire case for $2.25 million); see also id. at 60-63 (relating a plaintiff's jury verdict
totalling $250,000 for the drowning death of a three-year-old playing in a neighborhood
gravel pit); id. at 72 (recounting the settlement of a medical malpractice case for $675,000
involving brain damage suffered by a three-year-old girl); id. (discussing the settlement of a
medical malpractice case for $1.15 million involving injuries suffered by a newborn infant
from overheating of a hospital incubator); id. at 72-73 (reporting a plaintiff'sjury verdict of
$492,000 involving a medical malpractice suit against a hospital and physicians for negligently leaving a surgical clamp inside the abdomen of an elderly man for nine years); id. at
63-66 (preparing the foundation of settlement for a case close to the policy limits of a
million dollars against the pilot of a small private aircraft who crashed the plane while
intoxicated and caused the death of three passengers).
148
Curiously, Schlichtmann did not appear to have a miser's predilection to hoard
and accumulate stores of money. Harr compared Schlichtmann and his parmer Conway.
They differed in their approach to money, too. Conway lived frugally, saving to buy a house and start a family. Schlichtmann spent every penny he
earned. Conway noticed that Schlichtmann usually seemed depressed
145
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To complicate matters, Schlichtmann's greed mixed with a gambler's mindset. The Schlichtmann we come to know in A Civil Action
was a lawyer who repeatedly sought the big payoff. Time and again he
risked vast sums of money in various plaintiff-personal injury cases he
handled and brandished a cockiness and audacity which bordered on
recklessness and irresponsibility. 149 Schlichtmann's greedy gambler's
disposition led to the dilemma portrayed at the end of Harr's book.
In preparing the case, Schlichtmann had authorized the expenditure
of some two and a half million dollars for expert witness fees, exhibit
preparation, consulting fees, hotel and food bills, travels, etc. This left
him needing a settlement far in excess of a reasonable offer while at
the same time unable to afford to go on with further, time-consuming
litigation. 150 Schlichtmann's purported sin, then, was a fundamental
when he had money in the bank. He seemed driven by a need to get rid of
money as quickly as possible, and when he had spent it all, he would burrow
into another case and his spirits would rise.
Id. at 73.
Harr's account describes Schlichtmann's love of the material world in great detail. See
id. at 123-24 (describing Schlichtmann's use of the "Grand Ballroom at the Ritz-Carlton
and a private dining room for lunch and dinner breaks" to conduct settlement discussions
in a case). "At the end of the first day the parties retired to the dining room and continued their discussion over lobster bisque, tomatoes Provencale, grilled rack of lamb, and a
grand cru Bordeaux, all paid for by Schlichtmann." Id. at 123. When he opened his own
law firm,
Schlichtmann ordered a large conference room table, made of bird's-eye
maple and stainless steel [at a cost of $12,000], from the man who had
designed a similar table for the Blue Room of the White House. Surrounding the table were eight chairs of soft, buttery leather, each like a sofa unto
itself. Oak filing cabinets were specially built for the office, along with a
library to hold Schlichtmann's substantial collection. He had the decorator
install a kitchenette and bathrooms equipped with telephones and a spacious tiled shower. The firm leased the most advanced office computer
system available. In keeping with the opulence of the new office,
[Schlichtmann's secretary] arranged for fresh flowers to be delivered daily.
Id. at 124-25. Moreover, when Schlichtmann's new office opened, his
firm celebrated its opening with a huge party. A crane pulled up outside,
stopping traffic . . . for several hours, in order to hoist a grand piano
through the second-floor windows. The first floor of the building was occupied by a venerable old Irish pub named Patten's Bar & Grill.
Schlichtmann rented the pub for the evening and hired the best caterer in
town to prepare the food. Waiters in black tie served champagne. Onejazz
combo played downstairs at the bar while another played upstairs in the
office.
Id. at 125; see also id. at 351 (describing Schlichtmann's hand-tailored suits and Bally
shoes); id. at 4-5 (describing Schlichtmann's Porsche 928); id. at 448 (describing
Schlichtmann's need for Dmitri suits, a condominium and regnlar trips to Hawaii).
149 See id. at 127 (describing Schlichtmann's refusal of a million dollar insurance company settlement offer in a medical malpractice case).
150 See id. at 429 (reporting Schlichtmann's admission that his firm had spent two and
a half million dollars in preparing the case). See also id. at 379-492 (describing the deteriorating financial status of Schlichtmann and Schlichtmann's firm due to his actions in preparing the Woburn litigation). See also id. at 422 ("Schlichtmann looked at his partners.
'The money cannot be taken, not six point six million [dollars as a possible settlement
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one. His behavior appears to have forced him to place his own financial interests ahead of his responsibilities to his clients to seek a fair
and adequate verdict or settlement. 151 Based on Harr's account, it is
arguable that in this regard Schlichtmann's own financial interests
transgressed at least three of the Rules of Professional Conduct. First,
and somewhat paradoxically, Schlichtmann could be said, even in the
setting of a highly complex and indeterminate toxic tort case, 15 2 to
have violated Rule 1.1 ("Competence") by engaging in lavish and
wasteful case preparation that was not "reasonably necessary for the
representation" of the Woburn plaintiffs. 153 Second, given the
strongly negative reaction by some of the plaintiffs15 4 to the ultimate
eight million dollar settlement with Grace (with each family receiving
offer from Grace],' he said in a level voice. 'I cannot take fees and expenses out of that
and go to the families empty-handed and say, "Thanks for the privilege of representing
you."' ").
151 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcG pmbl. at 6 (1995) [hereinafter RULES]

("Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright
person while earning a satisfactory living.").
152 See supra notes 39-84 and accompanying text.
153 RuLEs, supranote 151, Rule 1.1. The full text of the Rule provides that: "[a] lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires
the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." Id.
A strong countervailing justification for Schlichtmann's lavish case preparation, however, is the fact that the defendants outspent the plaintiffs. Harr noted:
Schlichtmann had indeed been lavish with the expenses. That had always
been his way. He'd never spared any cost in preparing a case, and in
Woburn there had always been another well that could be drilled, another
medical test that could be performed. Yet he had not come close to matching the seven million dollars in legal fees and costs that Grace had paid for
its defense, not to mention the additional millions paid by Beatrice.
HARR, supra note 1, at 454.

154 Despite the fact that Schlichtmann only insisted on legal fees based on 28 percent
of the settlement-rather than the agreed amount of forty percent in his contingency contract-Anne Anderson "expressed anger at the size of Schlichtmann's fee," id. at 453, and
she joined another family, the Zona family, in disputing "some of the $2.6 million that
Schlichtmann had claimed in expenses." Id. at 454. Indeed, according to Harr:
When they raised this issue, Schlichtmann suggested they hire an accountant to go through the thousands of invoices. They took him up on the
invitation. The accountant questioned copying fees, interest charges, overtime expenses, and sundry other matters. Anne and the Zonas hired a lawyer to represent them. Ronald Zona called Donna Robbins '[another
plaintiff in the case] one night to enlist her support. He told Donna that
Schlichtmann had stolen half a million dollars from them.
Id. But Schlichtmann acted honorably in the final analysis with respect to the contention
that his firm had overbilled the plaintiffs for expenses:
Schlichtmann told the families that he would not dispute the accountant's
findings. He agreed to remit whatever sum the accountant deemed appropriate. The accountant submitted a list that came to eighty thousand dollars. Schlichtinann was prepared to divide this sum equally among the
[plaintiff] families, but none except Anne and the Zonas would accept any
of the money.
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$375,000 in cash at the time of the approval of the settlement agreement and another payment five years later of $80,000, with
Schlichtmann's case expenses amounting to $2.6 million and his legal
fees to $2.2 million), 15 5 Schlichtmann may have failed to fully abide by
the commands of Rule 1.4 ("Communication"). Schlichtmann arguably neglected to "explain ...matter[s] to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client[s] to make informed decisions regarding the
representation. 156 Third, Harr's account does not detail the original
consultation given by Schlichtmann to his multiple clients when he
took over as lead counsel in the case. To the extent that
Schlichtmann did not discuss "the implications of the common representation [of the plaintiffs by Schlichtmann] and the advantages and
risks involved" with the Woburn family members who became plaintiffs in the litigation, he may have violated Rule 1.7 ("Conflict of Interest; General Rule").157

Id. Part of Anne Anderson's negative reaction to Schlichtmann at the time of the settlement with Grace may have been affected by her pastor, Reverend Bruce Young. As explained by Harr:
He'd been furious-"bullshit mad," as he later put it-when he heard that
morning about the settlement. He felt he'd invested a lot of himself in this
matter, and to him taking Grace's money without a full disclosure by the
company, or any expressions of atonement, cheapened everything. The
way he saw it, the case had started out as a matter of principle. He recalled
Anne Anderson saying once that she wasn't after money, that what she
wanted was forJ. Peter Grace to come to her front door and apologize. As
far as Reverend Young was concerned, Schlichtmann had botched the first
part of the trial-the easy part-and then he'd sold out when things began
to look risky. Even worse, thought Young, was the way Schlichtmann was
now using his lawyerly powers of persuasion to convince the families that
they'd actually won something.
Id. at 452.
155

Id. at 453.

156

RuLEs, supra note 151, Rule 1.4(b).
Id. Rule 1.7(b) (2). An interesting comment to Rule 1.7 provides as follows:

157

Lawyer's Interests
The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. For example, a lawyer's need for income
should not lead the lawyer to undertake matters that cannot be handled
competently and at a reasonable fee. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5. If the probity
of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be
difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice.
In general, a more charitable interpretation of the story line in A Civil Action might
lead one to conclude that Schlichtmann really didn't have a personal financial conflict
with the interests of the plaintiffs in the Woburn litigation. See HAR, supra note 1, at 75,
417. Support for this view of the narrative can be gleaned from portions of the book where
Schlichtmann expresses a general desire to help people through the law while also helping
himself to fame and fortune.
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B. Jerome Facher
While Harr portrays Jerome Facher in a relatively unsympathetic
light,15 8 the text generally describes Facher as an ethical, but relentless, corporate defense lawyer.' 5 9 One significant issue' 60 of professional responsibility regarding Facher is raised, but not answered, in
Harr's tale: was Facher, in any moral way, ethically responsible for
interfering with Schlichtmann's documentary discovery requests of
what became known as the 'Yankee Environmental Engineering"
groundwater report?161 This issue is separate and distinct from the
question, which was extensively litigated, of whether or not Beatrice's
attorneys' "discovery misconduct" had "materially impaired"
Schlichtmann's preparation of the plaintiffs' case. 162 If Facher, in

fact, ordered that the Yankee Environmental Engineering report not
be turned over to Schlichtmann, or determined not to disclose the
existence of the report without seeking a protective order from the
trial court, he would theoretically be subject to disciplinary sanction
under Rule 3.4 ("Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel"). Specifically, Rule 3.4(a) instructs lawyers not to "unlawfully obstruct another
party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer
" 163
shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act.
Moreover, Facher may have breached Rule 3.4(d), which prohibits a
lawyer in pre-trial proceedings to "fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing
party.'
Given the amorphous language of Rule 3.4, with its qualifying
language of "unlawfully," "reasonably diligent effort" and "legally
proper discovery," it is unlikely that Facher would have been found to
have breached professional ethics. Since Schlichtmann's motion for a
158 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
159 See, e.g., HARR, supra note 1, at 85-86 (reporting that Facher was chairman of the
litigation department at the Boston firm of Hale and Don as well as an adjunct trial instructor at Harvard Law School); see also id. at 90 ("[Facher had] never seen a case that he
thought he could not have won."); id. at 86-90 (describing Facher's spartan work habits
and frugal temperament).
160 Two other minor issues of professional responsibility regarding Facher are raised in
Harr's book. First, the account of Schlichtmann's perception that Facher had talked about
the Woburn litigation with the trial court judge in an ex parte communication, see id. at
223-24, if true, would be a probable violation of Rule 3.5(b)'s prohibition against ex parte
communications between attorneys andjudges. Second, Facher's physical outburst, fighting words, and possible tortious intent toward Schlichtmann at a pre-trial hearing, id. at
461-62, arguably violated Rule 3.5(c), which prohibits a lawyer from "engag[ing] in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal." See also supranote 113 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
162
See HARR, supra note 1, at 123-26.
163 RuLts, supra note 151, Rule 3.4(a).
164
Id. Rule 3.4(d).
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new trial because of discovery misconduct by Beatrice's lawyers resulted in the Court's finding the Yankee Environmental Engineering
report nondispositive, because of the reciprocal misconduct, Facher
could be said to have, on balance, lawfully opposed Schlichtmann's
legally improper discovery requests.
C.

William Cheeseman

As the key lawyer for Grace up to the start of the trial, 65 William
Cheeseman was responsible for pre-trial motion practice and pre-trial
discovery in the Woburn litigation. Harr's narrative generally describes Cheeseman as an ethical and upstanding attorney who prided
himself on his "reputation at his firm for finding clever ways to kill
lawsuits in their infancy, with motions of demurrer or suxnmaryjudgment."166 But some of Cheeseman's "pre-trial maneuvering" in the
Woburn case, as described in Harr's book, presents a troubling ethical
issue of professional responsibility: when a lawyer represents an organization as a client, what are the lawyer's responsibilities to press for
candor from employees of the organization who may be lying during
the course of discovery?
According to Harr's account, William Cheeseman attended the
depositions of several Grace employees who were questioned by
Schlichtmann about the extent of their knowledge of dumping chemicals on Grace's property in Woburn, Massachusetts. 16 7 During early
Grace depositions, Schlichtmann had questioned the head of safety
and maintenance for Grace's Woburn plant and a former painter in
Grace's plant; both witnesses contended that they lacked knowledge
of any chemical dumping at Grace over the prior years. 168 When a
receiving clerk at the Grace plant, named Al Love, submitted to
Schlichtmann's depositions, however, Love admitted to seeing various
Grace employees dump leftover containers of waste solvents in a pit in
the facility's backyard. Moreover, Love acknowledged that he had
heard Grace employees joke about these pits. 169 In another starting
deposition revelation, Love informed Schlichtmann that he lived in
the east Woburn neighborhood, a few houses away from the lead
plaintiff, Anne Anderson, and that he had become concerned for the
165
Once the first phase-the "waterworks" phase-of the trifurcated trial proceeding
commenced, Cheeseman's colleague, Michael Keating, at Foley, Hoag & Eliot, took over
the litigation. HARR, supra note 1, at 296. Cheeseman did not play an active part in the
trial or intervening negotiations. For background references to Cheeseman's personality
and eccentricities, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
166
Id. at 95.
167
See id. at 155-83.
168
Id. at 155-60.
169
Id. at 160-62.
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safety of his family when he heard that Wells G and H were
contaminated.

17 0

Cheeseman, after Love's deposition, reacted to these revelations
by counselling Love to come forward so'that Grace could "get the Environmental Protection Agency in," so Grace could "clean up everything that might be in the ground.' 17 1 Cheeseman, also, notified
Schlichtmann when the former Grace painter partially recanted his
deposition testimony ("remembering" that he had been involved in
dumping solvent drums in a backyard pit at Grace's plant).172 From
these instances, one can infer that Cheeseman did not vigorously
press for the complete truth and disclosure of Grace's disposal practices in Woburn. Cheeseman could aptly defend himself from such an
accusation by answering that he had no responsibility as an advocate
under the Rules of Professional Conduct. In particular, Cheeseman
could point to Rule 1.13 ("Organization as Client") for authority to
support a laissez-faire approach by counsel to the Woburn discovery
scenario. Indeed, Rule 1.13 directs a lawyer representing an organization like Grace to take measures "designed to minimize disruption of
the organization and the risk of revealing information relating to the
representation to persons outside the organization." 173 So, Cheeseman might argue, it doesn't matter if some of Grace's employees lied
about their knowledge of past solvent dumping activities; Cheeseman's role was to prudently and methodically get to the bottom of the
matter without compromising the organizational interests, and potential tort liability, of W.R. Grace.
I acknowledge the persuasiveness of Cheeseman's hypothetical
defense based on existing professional rules of conduct. However,
along the lines of Professor Monroe H. Freedman's call for a "lawyer's
moral obligation of justification," 174 I question whether a lawyer in
Cheeseman's position shouldn't have a more robust ethical duty. As
stated by Professor Freedman:
A moral obligation of public justification is particularly appropriate
for lawyers.' Ours is a profession of public service. Indeed, we hold
a government-granted monopoly to serve a fundamental constitutional function-providing the right to counsel-and we hold that
unique power for the benefit of the people of the United States. In
a democratic society, the people are entitled to know what lawyers
do and why we do it. It is proper, therefore, to publicly challenge
lawyers to justify their representation of particular clients, and law170
171
172

173
174

Id. at 163-65.

Id. at 167.
Id. at 172.
RuL.Es, supra note 151, Rule 1.13(b).
Monroe H. Freedman, The Lawyer's Moral Obligation ofJustification, 74 TEx. L.Ruv.

111 (1995).
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yers, within the bounds of zealous representation, [and the lawyers]
are morally bound to respond.17 5
According to Professor Freedman's enlightened view, a lawyer does
play a moral role in the litigation process and is accountable to the
public at large for the decision to accept or reject a particular client.1 76 How does a lawyer like Mr. Cheesemanjustify his firm's continued representation of Grace in circumstances where it reasonably
appeared that several employees-and, by implication, management-were not telling the whole truth about prior waste disposal
practices at the Woburn Grace facility?
III
LAW AND LITERATuRE IMPLICATIONS

Use of the word "literature" "carries with it qualitative connotations which imply that the work in question has superior qualities; that
it is well above the ordinary run of written works."1 77 Moreover, the
word "literature" usually denotes works which belong to the majorfictional genres such as epic poetry, drama, lyric poetry, novel, short
story, or ode.' 78
In the last twenty-five years or so, theorists have recognized and
named a new genre of literature: "faction." Faction is a portmanteau
word-a word formed by combining two or more words. It originated
around 1970, "denot[ing] fiction which is based on and combined
with fact. 1 79 Notable examples of the genre include Norman Mailer's
The Armies of the Night, Truman Capote's In Cold Blood, and Alex
Haley's Roots.1 80 Use of the term "faction,"
might easily apply, for instance, to historical novels which combine
a great deal of period fact with fictional treatment, or to novels
which incorporate actual living personalities (e.g. the President of
the USA, the British Prime Minister or the General Secretary of the
Communist Party in the USSR) in a narrative about recent events
which pertain to historical fact. Faction has proved to be quite a
controversial matter, particularly in connection with television.18 1
As a finalist for the National Book Award, A Civil Action deserves
to be called literature; as a purported true-life account of a major mass
toxic tort case and its key participants that reads like a novel, it may
175
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usefully be referred to as faction. In my view, it is analogous to a
novel. Indeed, when the movie of A Civil Action is ultimately released, 182 the celluloid film version will probably qualify as faction
even more than the book does, since it is likely that Hollywood will
feel free to take certain liberties with the "facts" represented as truth
in Harr's book.
While A Civil Action, as a type of faction, is not a masterpiece of
world law-related literature, like The Merchant of Venice1 83 or The
Tria4184 it is, nevertheless, a best-selling literary expression of American popular culture. As noted by Richard A. Posner, "anyone who has
even a nodding acquaintance with modem American popular culture
realizes that it is suffused, even preoccupied, with legal themes."'185
Viewed as a work of popular American literature, Harr's book is significant on at least three different levels.
First, A Civil Action is a window on an emerging cultural obsession
with the American tort system. At the close of the twentieth century
more and more American tort cases are mass torts and, with increasing frequency, pit class action plaintiffs against Fortune 500 corporations and large government bureaucracies. We frequently call upon
our juries, consisting mostly of the unemployed, the underemployed
and minority group members, to grasp arcane scientific evidence
needed to decide liability and damages issues and thereby decide the
fate of multibillion dollar enterprises. Courtrooms around the country have become amphitheaters for pitched battles involving toxic
materials and hazardous products; filing cabinets full of documents,
multimedia computer displays, and in-courtroom computers have become the new weapons of legal gladiators. Yet, busy, generalist trial
court judges and, often, minimally-educated jurors find it arduous,
and at times impossible, to decide these complex mass toxic tort cases
based on the black letter law and the scientific evidence. So, by just
muddling through and making it up as they go along, our courts and
juries manage to cope. But the perception of justice being served is
often tarnished as the public comes to see how "big money" talks and
everyone else walks. This "stacked deck" problem in American civil
justice is brilliantly depicted in A Civil Action.
Second, Harr's factional account provides an intriguing view of
how laypersons often regard the law. His book is full of riveting and
humorous references to lay perceptions of the pomposity of the law,
lawyers, and legal institutions. Take, for example, the tearful reaction
182
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of a twenty-two-year-old woman, Patti D'Addieco; who was hired to
help out around Schlichtmann's law office to Jan Schlichtmann's tirades in the discovery portion of the Woburn case. Schlichtmann
wanted the woman to assemble every medical record of every child
plaintiff in the case-" [h] e wanted her to find the report of every visit
86
to a doctor, of every scraped knee, sore throat, and common cold."'
When the assistant insisted that she could not assemble the complete
records of plaintiff Anne Anderson because one of her former doctors
was dead, the following command bellowed forth out of
Schlichtmann's lungs, reducing his assistant to tears: "I don't care!
...

Dig the man out of his fucking grave! Go to his widow's house

and get them out of the fucking basement! Do you think Facher cares
87
why you can't get the medical records?"'
Another example was Anne Anderson's and Reverend Bruce
Young's negative reactions to Schlichtmann's counselling skills regarding the settlement with Grace. Bruce Young's cynical view of
Schlichtmann's discussions with the plaintiff-families was based on
Young's belief that Schlichtmann had "sold out" for his own benefit
and then made the situation worse by disingenuously patronizing his
clients about the value of the settlement. Anne Anderson viewed
Schlichtmann's discussions about settlement possibilities with the
plaintiffs as akin to Schlichtmann treating his clients like children
188
while, all along, systematically excluding her input.
186
HARR, supra note 1, at 198. "For those children with leukemia, the records consisted of thousands of pages-lab tests, chemotherapy protocols, the notes of nurses, doctors, social workers, and psychiatrists. And for the adults, some records dated back to the
1930s." Id. at 198-99.
187 Id. at 199. As humorously related by Harr,
Some months later Patti D'Addieco got her revenge. For
Schlichtmann's birthday, she wrote a song-the "Schlichtmann Rap"-and
sang it to him at the office party.
Now let me tell you a story 'bout a man named Jan
Gonna rock you into justice like no other mother can
You can see it in his smile as he's walkin' into trial
His hands'll be washed and his clothes'll have style
Now I want medical records and I want 'em done right
I don't care if you gotta stay here all night
I want 'em perfect and I want 'em neat
And if you fuck 'em up, you be walking on the street.
What, no juice? I made it perfectly clear
That there's always gotta be some juice in here
And it's gotta be natural and it's gotta cost more
Than any other juice in any other store
Now before we end this Schlichtmann rap
Lemme tell ya one more thing 'bout this Schlichtmann chap
He's got a quick tongue and he's got a keen wit
And the best thing about him is he can take this shit.
Id. at 199-200.
188 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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Finally, a .third- significant -feature of A Civil Action is its highlywrought satirical and political characterization, which resembles Tom
Wolfe's novelistic work of popular fiction-The Bonfire of the Vanities.'8 9 Jonathan Harr's factional account delicately and indirectly
ridicules, censures, and derides the egotistical and money-grubbing
world of the "big shot" trial lawyer. True to the satirical form, Harr's
work is "a kind of protest, a sublimation and refinement of anger and
indignation." 190 In a way, Harr's dystopian treatment of Judge Skinner, Schlichtmann, Facher and Cheeseman, and the other less visible
lawyers in his tale, is reminiscent of George Orwell's bitter treatment
of various political figures in Animal Farm.19 1 Unlike Animal Farm,
however, where the characters are fabled caricatures of contemporary
figures, the characters in A Civil Action do not need animalistic embodiment. Harr achieves the same literary effect by depicting the respective characters-through their own words, their own actions, their
own failures to act-as tabloid-like caricatures of your average "slippery" American lawyer.
A Civil Action is also a political narrative with Schlichtmann portrayed as a lawyer trying to buck the establishment, send a message,
and hold corporate America accountable for its poisons. 192 In his
quest, he faces huge obstacles put in place by powerful business interests and a conservative legal culture. It is ironic that he represents
lower middle class victims of chemical contamination but tries to
"walk the walk" and "talk the talk" of the big shot trial lawyers, representing Fortune 500 companies, whom he opposes. In the end,
Schlichtmann functionally loses his political-legal battle ju'st as Sherman McCoy, the Wall Street bond dealer who thinks of himself as a
"Master of the Universe," owns a lavish Park Avenue apartment, and
drives a Mercedes, loses his political-legal struggle in The Bonfire of the
93
Vanities.'
Tom Wolfe's New York is ruled by snobbery, greed, fear and vanity; the legal system which snags Sherman McCoy is a warped one in
which only the most unscrupulous and avaricious lawyers thrive. Similarly, Jonathan Harr's Boston, portrayed in A Civil Action, is governed
by a plethora of human vices. The legal system that professionally and
personally defeats Jan Schlichtmann is only marginally responsive to
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injustice. One concludes from reading The CivilAction that the system
19 4
is in need of a major overhaul.

194
I am indebted to Richard A. Posner's analysis of THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES and
helpful insights and inspiration he provided; his "law and literature" analysis has helped
shaped my own view of A CIVIL ACnON. See POSNER, supra note 31, at 481-89.
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